Case Summaries
Criminal Law & Procedure
[02/03] US v. Mahin
In a prosecution on two counts of possessing a firearm or ammunition while subject to a domestic violence protective order in violation of 18 USC section 922(g)(8), the judgment of conviction is: 1) affirmed in part, where the statute and its application to the defendant's firearm use the same day he was served with a protective order did not violate the Second Amendment under the intermediate scrutiny standard; and 2) reversed in part and remanded for resentencing, where it was plain error to convict and sentence the defendant on two separate counts for the simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition under section 922(g)(8).
[02/03] US v. Culbertson
In a prosecution in which the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to import 100 grams or more of heroin and five kilograms or more of cocaine, the case is remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate the judgment of conviction, where: 1) there was an inadequate factual basis for the defendant's guilty plea with respect to the quantity of drugs for which he was responsible; and 2) the district court's error in accepting the defendant's plea was not harmless.
[02/03] US v. Leahy
In a sentencing challenge brought by a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the district court's 10-year sentence is affirmed, where: 1) the district court's application of enhancements under the sentencing guidelines and its inclusion of criminal history points was procedurally reasonable; and 2) the sentence, although the maximum possible, was substantively reasonable, as the district court articulated a plausible sentencing rationale and imposed a sentence within the range of reasonable outcomes.
[02/02] US v. Rivera-Santana
In a sentencing challenge after the appellant was convicted of illegal reentry into the United States after being removed for a conviction of an aggravated felony, the sentencing court's judgment order is affirmed, where: 1) two upward departures in the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, augmented by an upward variance of 90 months therefrom, were not procedurally unreasonable; and 2) the resulting sentence, which was the statutory maximum, was not substantively unreasonable.